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Morgan: The Office of the Attorney General

THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ROBERT MORGAN*

I.

HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

The ancient and honorable office of the Attorney General is over six
hundred years old, apparently coming into existence as early as 1278 A.D.'
The term "Attorney General" appears to have first been used in 1398
when a certificate of the Duke of Norfolk was signed by four attorneys
2
general.
The authority of the Attorney General in England was very extensive
and is set out as follows:
(1)

To prosecute all actions necessary for the protection and defense
of the property and revenue of the Crown.
(2) By information, to bring certain classes of persons accused of
crimes and misdemeanors to trial.
(3) By "scire facias," to revoke and annul grants made by the Crown
improperly, or when forfeited by the grantee.
(4) By information, to recover money and other chattels, or damages for wrongs committed on the land, or other possessions of
the Crown.
(5) By writ of mandamus, to compel the admission of an officer duly
chosen to his office, and to compel his restoration when illegally
Ousted.
(6) By information to chancery, to enforce trusts, and to prevent
public nuisances, and the abuse of trust powers.'
It is evident, therefore, that by the time the Colonial Governments were
established in America, the office of the Attorney General in England had
well-defined powers. In the new American Colonies, the office of the
* Attorney General North Carolina 1969: LL.B. Wake Forest Law School;
Attorney General acknowledges contributions of the following in preparation of this
article: James L. Blackburn, Howard Satisky, Russell G. Walker, Burley Mitchell,
Ted Eastman.
'Bellot, "The Origin of the Attorney General," 25 Law Quart. Rev. 400 (1909).
Id.; at 405.
People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396 (N.Y. 1868).
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Attorney General became a part of the Colonial Governments and later the
4
State Governments.
The Constitution of North Carolina provides that the Attorney
General is to be elected for a term of four years by the qualified electors
of the State.5 His term of office is to commence on the first day of
January next after his election, and is to continue until his successor is
elected and qualified.6 Any vacancy in the office of the Attorney General
will be filled by the Governor.'
The Department of Justice, created in 1939, is presently under the
supervision and direction of the Attorney General. 8 By statute, the
Attorney General must devote his full time to that office and is prohibited by law from engaging in the private practice of law while serving
as Attorney General.' However, no statute has been found that requires
the Attorney General to be a lawyer.
The Attorney General serves on several major committees, some of
which are set out as follows:
(1) State Armory Commission"
(2) State Eugenics Commission 1
12
(3) Tryon Palace Commission
(4) Judicial Council 3
In addition, the Attorney General serves, ex officio, as the legal adviser
4
of the Executive Department.'
II.

POWER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO REPRESENT
STATE AGENCIES

In England the Attorney General was Chief Legal Advisor for the
Crown and had charge of the management of all legal affairs and the
prosecution of all suits in which the Crown was interested. 5 It has been
'Hammonds, "The Attorney General in the American Colonies," Anglo-American Legal History Series, V. 1, No. 3 (1939).
N.C. Const. art. 3, § 7.
6Id.
Id.
S N.C.

Gen. Stat. 114-1.
N.C. Gen. Stat. 114-3.
10 N.C. Gen. Stat. 143-230.
N.C. Gen. Stat. 35-40.
l'N.C. Gen. Stat. 121-19.
N.C. Gen. Stat. 7-448.

'1
IS

1,N.C. Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14.
7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorney General, § 6 (1962).
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repeatedly held that the Attorney General had the exclusive right to
represent the Crown.1 6 When the states broke away from the Crown,
the sovereign became the people as represented by their governments.
Thus, the logical conclusion in interpreting the common law was that the
Attorney General had the duty and the exclusive right to represent these
governments and their agencies and officers. Beginning in the 19th
Century, a trend developed in a number of states to diminish the Attorney
General's common law power to exclusively represent the State agencies.
Legislation was passed enabling certain State agencies to hire their own
attorneys or allowing the Governor to appoint the attorneys."' Various
reasons have been given for this limiting trend, among them being the
distrust of centralization and the recognition of certain weaknesses in
some of the Attorneys General.' 9
Today the states are split into several groups with some states continuing to give the Attorneys General exclusive power to represent State
agencies and others allowing these agencies to hire their own attorneys.
In North Carolina several boards and commissions are given the express
authority by statute to hire their own counsel, some examples being the
Utilities Commission,2" Employment Security Commission,2 ' and Board
of Medical Examiners.2
There have been numerous court decisions on this subject in jurisdictions other than North Carolina. One line of decisions has held that,
since at common law the Attorney General had exclusive power of
representation, any statute in degradation of this policy must be express
and unambiguous.' Other courts have held that statutes can impliedly
grant an agency the authority to hire its own attorney even though the
particular jurisdiction recognizes the common law. Specific grants of
power to an agency to sue and be sued in its own name, or to engage in
' Commonwealth v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 At1. 524, 527 (1936); Rex
v. Austin, 9 Price 142, 147 Eng. Rep. 48 (1820) ; Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397 (1941).
"'Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. at 443, 22 A.2d at 407
(1941).
1 National Association of Attorney General's Committee on the Office of Attorney General, John B. Breckinridge, Chairman, Study of the Office of Attorney

General, Preliminary Draft (Unpublished), Sec. 1.3-1.6, p. 1 (Jan. 1970).
1JId.

20

N.C. Gen. Stat. 62-21 (1963).
Gen. Stat. 96-4(d) (1957).
:' N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21 (1915).
'8
Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, supra; 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorney General,
1N.C.

Sec. 9 (1962).
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litigation, have been held to impliedly grant the authority to that agency
to hire its own counsel.2 4
A few courts have taken the view that statutory boards not contemplated by the Constitution of the State are not governed by the
common law rule.25 In at least three states where legal services are
basically centralized in the Attorney General, universities provide exceptions on the grounds that the duties and functions of a university provide
it with a legal personality of its own different from a State agency or
2
officer. 1
North Carolina G.S. 114-2(2) and 114-2(3) make it the duty of the
Attorney General to prosecute and defend all actions for the Governor,
Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, Utilities Commissioner, Commissioner of Banks, Insurance Commissioner, or Superintendent of Public
Instruction if the agency heads request it, and to represent all State
institutions if the head of the institution requests it. North Carolina G.S.
143-298 makes it the duty of the Attorney General to represent all departments, institutions, and agencies of the State in connection with tort
claims against them. Furthermore, North Carolina G.S. 146-70 says that
the Attorney General shall bring any actions or proceedings involving
lands in which the State has an interest. Thus, in these two areas the
Attorney General is expressly given the duty to represent the State.
The principal statute dealing with the question of representation in
North Carolina is G.S. 147-17, which is set out in part as follows:
§ 147-17. May employ counsel in cases wherein State is interested.
-(a) No department, agency, institution, commission, bureau or other
organized activity of the State which receives support in whole or in
part from the State shall employ any counsel, except with the approval
of the Governor. In any case or proceeding, civil or criminal, in or
before any court or agency of this State or any other state or the
United States, or in any other matter in which the State of North
Carolina is interested, the Governor may employ such special counsel
as he may deem proper or necessary to represent the interest of the
State, and may fix the compensation for their services.
(b) The Attorney General shall be counsel for all departments,
agencies, institutions, commissions, bureaus or other organized activ", Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. 1, 27 So. 2d 524 (1946); Saint v. Allen, 172
La. 350, 134 So. 246 (1931).
Holland v. Watson, 153 Fla. 178, 14 So. 2d 200 (1943).
Study of the Office of Attorney General, Preliminary Draft, supra note 4.
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ities of the State which receive support in whole or in part from the
State. Whenever the Attorney General shall advise the Governor that
it is impracticable for him to render legal services to any State agency,
institution, commission, bureau or other organized activity, or to defend
a State employee or former employee as authorized by article 31A of
chapter 143 of the General Statutes, the Governor may authorize the
employment of such counsel, as in his judgment, should be employed to
render such services, and may fix the compensation for their services.
[Emphasis added]
In examining the origins of this statute, it appears that subsection (a)
was originally meant to confer powers on the Governor to employ private
counsel without consulting the Attorney General, at least with regard to
legal services involving an adversary proceeding.2 7 It seems likely that
subsection (b) was intended to serve as a limitation on these powers.
III.

POWER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO REPRESENT
THE PUBLIC INTEREST

While the existence of a common law power or duty in the Attorney
General to represent the public interest has not been unquestionably established, it very likely does exist. The common law of England'8 is, by
statute, in force in North Carolina to the extent that it has not been
repealed or abrogated nor become obsolete or repugnant to freedom.29
The North Carolina Constitution provides that the duties of the Attorney
General shall be prescribed by law.8" Other states, relying on similar
constitutional and statutory provisions, have found the office of Attorney
General to be clothed with common law powers and duties.3 ' In the
early case of Hunt, Attorney General v. Chicago Horse and Dummy
Ry. Co.,8 2 the Illinois Supreme Court said:
The duties of such an office are so numerous and varied that it has not
been the policy of legislatures to attempt the difficult task of enumerating
" N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, c. 270; N.C. Pub. Laws 1873-74, c. 160; N.C.
Pub. Laws 1901, c. 744; N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, c. 207; See Coates, The State's
Legal Business, 16 N.C.L. REV. 119 at 137, 138 (1937-38).
29 State Ex Rel. Bruton v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160
S.E.2d
482 (1968).
2
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 4-1.
90 N.C. Const. art. III, § 13.
Hunt, Attorney General v. Chicago Horse and Dummy Ry. Co., 121 Ill. 638,
13 N.E. 176 (1887); State v. Missouri Public Service Commission, 352 Mo. 29,
175 .9S.W.2d
121 Ill.857
638,(1943).
13 N.E. 176 (1887).
0
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them exhaustively, but they have ordinarily been content, after expressly defining such as they have deemed the most important, to have
the residue as they exist at common law, so far as applicable to our
jurisprudence and system of government.33
No North Carolina case has been found dealing specifically with the
question of whether the Attorney General possesses a common law power
and duty to represent the public interest. Even absent a case responding
specifically to this question, there is authority on which to assume the
existence of this power and duty. In the recent case of Sternberger v.
Tannenbaum,34 the North Carolina Supreme Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Parker, stated that the Attorney General has retained his
common law power and duties regarding charitable trusts. From this
statement the conclusion can be reasonably drawn that the Attorney
General has retained his full common law power; it would be unreasonable to assume the retention of common law power only in the charitable
trust field.
However, the existence of a common law power and duty to represent
the public interest is an academic question in North Carolina due to
action taken by the General Assembly in 1969. During that legislative
session a bill, 5 codified as G.S. 114-2(8), was enacted which amended
the list of duties of the Attorney General. As amended, that statute now
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
[It shall be the duty of the Attorney General:]
(8) a. To intervene, when he deems it to be advisable in the public
interest, in proceedings before any courts, regulatory officers, agencies
and bodies, both State and federal, in a representative capacity for and
on behalf of the using and consuming public of this State. He shall
also have the authority to institute and originate proceedings before
such courts, officers, agencies or bodies and shall have authority to
appear before agencies on behalf of the State and its agencies and
citizens in all matters affecting the public interest. [Emphasis added]
b. Upon the institution of any proceeding before any State agency
by application, petition or other pleading, formal or informal, the outcome of which will affect a substantial number of residents of North
Carolina, such agency or agencies shall furnish the Attorney Gen8

1 d.at 180.
'273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).
"' Session Laws of North Carolina, Chapter 535 (1969).
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eral with copies of all such applications, petitions and pleadings so
filed, and, when the Attorney General deems it advisable in the public
interest to intervene in such proceedings, he is authorized to file responsive pleadings and to appear before such agency either in a representative capacity in behalf of the using and consuming public of this
3 6
State or in behalf of the State or any of its agencies.
It seems certain that the General Assembly intended, by this amendment, to clearly establish the power and duty of the Attorney General to
represent the public interest quite separate and apart from the existence
of any such power and duty at common law. The language used, particularly in the last sentence of (8)a, above provides solid statutory
authority to support the existence of a broad, general power and duty to
represent the public interest.
IV.

POWER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO ABATE
PUBLIC NUISANCES

As a rule the Attorney General of a state retains the common law
7
powers of that office except where they are expressly modified by statute."
As mentioned earlier, North Carolina has by statute 8 declared the common law to be in full force except where repealed, obsolete, abrogated
or repugnant to freedom and independence. The "common law" referred
to in the General Statutes of North Carolina has been held to be the com9
mon law of England at the time of the American Revolution in 1776.40
In 1939 the Attorney General was given the duty of performing "all
duties now required of his office by law."' 4 ' The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has clearly adopted the view, without expressly stating it, that
the phrase "all duties now required of his office by law" includes the
Attorney General's common law powers. The Court has stated that:
In the absence of statute and barring those instances where an individual
may take action because of his special damage .... 'The State is the
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 114-2(8).
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorney General § 7 (1962).
N.C. Gen. Stat. 4-1.
"State Ex rel. Bruton v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d

482 (1968); State v. Lackey, 271 N.C. 171, 155 S.E.2d 465 (1967); State v.
Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961).
o State

Ex rel. Bruton v. Flying "W"

Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 417;

160 S.E.2d 482, 494 (1968).
" N.C. Gen. Stat. 114-6.
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proper party of wrongs done to its citizens by a public nuisance'; ...
and we are of the opinion that this must be done, as heretofore, on the
relation of its Attorney General. 42 [Emphasis added]

Further, the Court, expressly relying on pre-revolutionary English
case law, has very recently stated that the Attorney General retains his
common law powers as to charitable trusts. 43 As stated previously there
seems to be no reason why the Attorney General's common law power to
protect charitable trusts would be retained in preference to others. Therefore, it must be assumed that his full common law powers have been retained.
Under the common law the Attorney General was given broad powers
to institute actions in equity, as relator, to abate purprestures44 and public
nuisances."
Common law actions for nuisance, purpresture or any other matter
affecting the people generally in the same manner as individual complainants, could only be maintained by the Attorney General.4 Some
of the cases stating the extent of these common law powers are particularly relevant to current ecological problems. At common law for
example:
.. . any invasion of or encroachment on the sea shore or bed of an
mark,
estuary or navigable tidal river between high and low-water
47
while the same remains in the Crown is a purpresture.
Such invasions and encroachments were abated by the Courts of
England in actions brought by the Attorney General.4" Current problems
of pollution and abuse of estuaries may well result in public demand for
reassertion of these powers over the physical environment.
McLean v. Townsend, 227 N.C. 642; 44 S.E.2d 36 (1947).
"Sternberger v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).

Def.-"An inclosure by a private party of that which belongs to . . . the
A public nuisance must be something which subjects the public
public at large ....

to some degree of inconvenience or annoyance; but a purpresture may exist without
putting the public to any inconvenience whatever." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1401 (4th ed. 1951).
" 1 Wood, The Law of Nuisances 107-110 (3d ed. 1893).

; Anno., 3 Atk. 7504" Baines v. Baker, 1 Amb. 158, 27 Eng. Rep. 105 (1752)
751, 26 Eng. Rep. 1230 (1752).
Attorney General v. Chamberlaine, 4 K & J 292, 70 Eng. Rep. 122 (1858).
2 Storey Equity Jurisdiction 223, § 922 (13th ed. 1886); 1 Wood, The Law
of Nuisances 107-109 (3d ed. 1893); Attorney General v. Richards, 3 Anstruther
753, 145 Eng. Rep. 1028 (1794) and cases cited: Anno. 3 Atk. 750, 26 Eng. Rep.

1230 (1752).

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol2/iss2/2

8

Morgan: The Office of the Attorney General
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
V.

POWER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO
CHARITABLE TRUSTS

49
The Attorney General of North Carolina is charged by statute and
by common law"0 with the duty of protecting charitable trusts. In cases
of mismanagement of charitable trusts, the clerk of the superior court is
required to give notice to the Attorney General or the solicitor who represents the county. It is then the duty of the one so notified to bring an
action, in the name of the State, for an accounting by the grantees,
5
executors, or trustees of the charitable fund. '
The Attorney General may enforce, by a suit for writ of mandamus, any
2
Should a specific charitable purpose
transfer for charitable purposes.
become illegal, impossible, or impracticable of fulfillment, the Attorney
General may, where the settlor or testator manifested a general charitable
intent, apply to the superior court for an order requiring administration
53
to fulfill the general charitable intent.
In an action against the trustee of a charitable trust, upon a contract
within his power as trustee, the plaintiff is required to give notice by mail
4
to the Attorney General of the existence and nature of the action. Failure
to give the required notice bars enforcement against the trust property
5
The Attorney General
of an enusing judgment in the plaintiff's favor.
may intervene in such actions to contest the right of the plaintiff to
56

recover.
The statutes requiring the Attorney General to perform certain duties
relative to charitable trusts should not be construed as limitations upon
58
57
his powers. He retains extremely broad statutory and common law
powers in this area. It seems that, at common law:
Any question affecting a charitable trust may be brought before the
59
court by information in the name of the Attorney General.
36-35.
" N.C. Gen. Stat. 36-20, 36-23.1,27336-23.2,
N.C. 658, 678-679, 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).
" Sternberger v. Tannenbaum,
"' N.C. Gen. Stat. 36-20.

" N.C. Gen. Stat. 36-23.1 (c).
"' N.C. Gen. Stat. 36-23.2(a).
"N.C. Gen. Stat. 36-35(b).

5&Id.
soId.

"7N.C. Gen. Stat. 36-23.1(d), 114-6.

s Sternberger v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 678-679; 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).
Hill on Trusts 458 (1846) citing numerous English cases.
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina seems to have adopted this broad
view in its statement that, where charitable trusts are concerned, "If
the Attorney General is not a necessary party, he surely is a proper
party.

60

The original common law powers of the Attorney General were based
on the interest of the Crown. As the theory of the divine rights of monarchs declined, however, the interest of the sovereign came to be expressed
in terms of "public interest." The power of the Attorney General to
protect charitable trusts has in recent years, therefore, been found
necesary:
Because of the public interest necessarily involved in a charitable trust
or gift to charity and essential to its legal classification as a charity, it
is generally recognized that the attorney general, in his capacity as
representative of the state and of the public, is the, or at least a, proper
party to institute and maintain proceedings for the enforcement of such
a gift or trust. 61
VI. POWER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN
CRIMINAL ACTIONS

The common law powers of the Attorney General of England have
been enumerated as: (1) To prosecute all actions necessary for the protection and defense of the property and revenues of the Crown, and (2) by
information, to bring certain classes of persons accused of crimes and
misdemeanors to trial.62 These broad powers gave the Attorney General
of England control over a criminal case from its very inception at the trial

court level through the appellate procedure. During Colonial North Carolina, the duties of the Attorney General included the supervision of "all
details of the King's cases from beginning to end," 6 and "all the powers,

authority, and trust that the Attorney and Solicitor of England had in
'
that Kingdom."64
The North Carolina constitutional provision establishing the office of
Attorney General declares that, in addition to specified duties, the Attorney
Sternberger v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658; 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).
15 Am. Jur. 2d, Charities, § 119, as quoted with approval in Sternberger v.
Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658; 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).
"People v. Miner, 2 Lans. (N.Y.) 396 (1868).
" Hammonds, "The Attorney General in the American Colonies," Anglo-Amercian Legal History Series V. I, No. 3 (1939), at p. 11.
" North Carolina Colonial Records, Vol. 7, p. 486, 1765 to 1768.
60
61
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General shall exercise all other duties prescribed by law.6 The General
Assembly is authorized to enact laws defining the authority of the Attorney
General concerning prosecution of crimes and the administration of the
State's criminal laws.66
As provided by statute, the Attorney General's duties in the appellate
courts are "[t]o defend all actions in the appellate division in which the
State shall be interested, or is a party."67 In all criminal cases that are
appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, the
Attorney General represents the State before those tribunals, both by brief
and argument.
Also, under the North Carolina Constitution, Art. III, § 16, the
solicitor shall "perform such duties related to appeals therefrom [Superior
Courts of his district] as the Attorney General may require." It would
appear that under the provision the Attorney General could require that a
solicitor assist him in preparing the State's brief or upon argument in the
appellate courts when there is an appeal from a criminal action in the
Superior Courts of the respective solicitor's district.
It shall be the duty of the Attorney General "when requested by the
Governor or either branch of the General Assembly to appear for the
State in any other court or tribunal in any cause or matter, civil or
criminal, in which the State may be a party or interested."6 8 This appears
to be the only way that the Attorney General can prosecute a criminal
action in the trial courts unless a specific statute gives him power to
prosecute a particular offense. At the request of a designated executive
officer or the official head of a State institution, the Attorney General
shall prosecute and defend suits related to matters connected with their
departments or institutions.69 This is distinguishable from general criminal prosecutions at the trial level.
The statute that the North Carolina Supreme Court has relied heavily
upon to restrict the powers of the Attorney General over local prosecutions
is North Carolina General Statute 114-2 (4), which provides that the duty
of the Attorney General shall be "[t]o consult with and advise the
solicitors, when requested by them, in all matters pertaining to the duties
of their office." This language implies that if the Attorney General, upon
North Carolina Constitution, art. III, sec. 13.
"North Carolina Constitution, art. III, sec. 18.
0
N.C. Gen. Stat. 114-2(1).
"Id.;
See example in 8 N.C. Law Rev. 344 (1930).
69
N.C. Gen. Stat. 114-2(2), (3).
:5
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the solicitor's request, sent an attorney from his office to assist a solicitor,
it would be only in an advisory capacity.
The two North Carolina cases that have considered this problem are
State v. Loesch, ° and N.A.A.C.P. v. Eure, Secretary of State.7 1 The
court in State v. Loesch, supra, concluded that the several solicitors of the
State, as well as the Attorney General, are constitutional officers, so that
the Attorney General has no constitutional authority to issue a directive to
solicitors concerning their legal duties. The Court relied on Art. III, Sec.
18, of the North Carolina Constitution, giving the General Assembly the
authority to enact suitable laws defining the powers of the Attorney
General, and pursuant to the above authority, the General Assembly enacted N.C. General Statute 114-2 prescribing the Attorney General's
duties. Subsection 4 provides that he shall consult with and advise the
solicitors when requested by them. Therefore, the court reasoned, the duty
of the Attorney General insofar as it extends to the solicitors of the State
is purely advisory. The Attorney General has no constitutional authority
to issue a directive to any other constitutional officer concerning his legal
duties. The court in N.A.A.C.P. v. Eure, Secretary of State, supra, also
concluded that the duty of the Attorney General insofar as it extends to
the State's solicitors is purely advisory, when the Attorney General has
no specific enforcement duty in connection with the statute under which
prosecution is sought.
The trend has been from a centralized to decentralized control of
prosecutions in North Carolina by the Attorney General. When the circuit that the Attorney General covered during Colonial North Carolina
became too large, he was given the right to appoint deputies in each
county. Then the General Assembly began to appoint his deputies. A
Solicitor General was thereafter created with control over the solicitors,
and by 1806 the Attorney General was restricted to one of six State districts in which he could prosecute at the trial level. In 1868 the General
Assembly gave the solicitors power to prosecute in the trial courts, thus
relieving the Attorney General of the duty of prosecuting trial dockets
in any district in the State.
Perhaps the primary consideration that must be borne in mind when
examining the relationship between the Attorney General and the local prosecutor is that the office of Attorney General is of common
70237 N.C. 611, 75 S.E.2d 654 (1953).
"' 245 N.C. 331, 95 S.E.2d 893 (1957).
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law origin while that of the local prosecutor is purely statutory. The
courts of at least four states,' 2 although recognizing the general capacity
of the Attorney General to use common law powers, have reasoned that,
when the Legislature delegates duties, which were the Attorney General's
function under common law, to a prosecuting attorney, the powers so
delegated vest exclusively in the local prosecutor. The rationale behind
these decisions is that the office of prosecuting attorney is carved out of
the office of Attorney General, and vesting such duties in the prosecuting
attorney necessarily divests them from the Attorney General. Yet the
Minnesota,7 ' New York" and Pennsylvania 5 courts have held such powers
to be concurrent in like situations. It is unclear whether the North Carolina
Supreme Court is saying that the office of solicitor has been carved out
of the office of the Attorney General, or whether it is basing its decision
solely on our statute that says the Attorney General shall advise and
consult with the solicitors, and concluding therefrom that he has no active
duties as a prosecutor.
Various authorities" have advocated centering authority for criminal
prosecutions in a central state office such as that of the Attorney General.
They contend that such centralization would be more effective than the
existing patchwork of prosecutors in combating organized crime, assuring
more uniform application and enforcement of the criminal laws, providing
for better qualified and better compensated local prosecutors, and generally improving the level of administration of criminal justice. However,
if the Attorney General possessed such power, he would be able to intervene only in occasional cases of great importance; he must necessarily
leave to the local prosecuting officers the general task of law enforcement
within their respective territories.
" Kansas: See State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P. 910 (1929). New Jersey:
See Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs of N.Y. v. Lehigh U.R.R., 106 N.J. Law 411, 149 A.
263 (1930). Oregon: See In Re State v. Millis, 61 Ore. 244, 119 Pac. 763 (1912).
West Virginia: See State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935 (1909).
" State Ex Rel. Young, Att'y Gen. v. Village of Kent, 96 Minn. 225, 104 N.W.
948 (1905); State Ex Rel. Young v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 112 N.W. 269
(1907).
"People v. Brennan, 69 Misc. 548, 127 N.Y. Supp. 958 (1910): People v.
Tru-Sport Pub. Co., 160 Misc. 628, 291 N.Y. Supp. 449 (1936).
" Commonwealth Ex Rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, Att'y Gen., 325 Pa. 17, 188 A.
524 (1936).
" American Bar Association, The Prosecution Function, 2.2(b), and 20
A.B.A.J. 651 (1934); The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, a report by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, p. 149

(1967); 1952 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Model Department of Justice Act, Section 7.
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